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This research aims to provide an overview of management strategies of French hypermarket 
Carrefour and Japanese general merchandise store Ito-Yokado in China. In recent years, the 
Chinese economy has shown profound changes. With numerous foreign enterprises entering the 
retail market, the competition is especially keen among them. To capture greater market share, 
Carrefour and Ito-Yokado adapted their management strategies for China. On the one hand, 
Carrefour entered many cities thanks to their good relationship with local governments, and 
opened a number of stores. On the other hand, Ito-Yokado, which stands firmly by its dominant 
strategy, has opened stores in only two cities, and the number of new stores opened is not 
increasing as fast as Carrefour. The human resource strategies of Carrefour and Ito-Yokado are 
different; while the former gives personnel authority to the local level, emphasizes intensive 
training and promotes more Chinese employees to store manager’s position, the latter leaves 
the personnel authority to headquarters, educates employees through daily conferences, and 
has a slower rate of promotion than the former. The paper concludes that one reason that Ito-
Yokado localizes less human resource management than Carrefour may be due to its corporate 





In the years since the institution of China’s 1978 open-door policy, the Chinese economy 
has changed profoundly because of several factors. Entry into the WTO in 2001 and changing 
economic policies have encouraged many foreign companies to expand their markets into 
China. This paper will focus on the retail industry, in which competition has become very keen 
in recent years. It was originally necessary for foreign retail companies to find Chinese partners 
to open stores. However, after the passing of a law in December 2004, foreign retailers can now 
set up stores in any region. Moreover, they do not have to meet prohibitive asset and sales 
requirements. Since then, the number of foreign retail companies in China has increased. In 
2007, gross sales of the top 100 chain stores in China have passed the one billion RMB mark.     
How do foreign retailers practice their management strategy in order to adapt to the changes 
of China’s economy and gain market clout? This paper examines Carrefour, the French 
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 hypermarket, and the Japanese general merchandise store (GMS) Ito-Yokado (イトーヨーカ堂) as 
examples to investigate this research question. A hypermarket is “a supermarket with a sales 
area larger than 2,500 square meters. Products sold in hypermarkets include food, garden items, 
stationery and books, compact discs, household appliances, toys, camping, sports and home 
items, clothing, and footwear.” (Lira, Rivero, and Vergara, 2007, p.239). General Merchandise 
Store is a supermarket with a sales area larger than 3000 square meters. Products are domestic 
supplies, and food and clothing that make up more than 10% and less than 70% respectively. 
The reason this paper focuses on Carrefour is not merely because of its high prestige in the 
world and its high total sales in China, but also because the company paid much more attention 
to the Chinese market than other Western counterparts. According to statistics from 2009, 
Carrefour was ranked top ten in the Chinese retail market, and it has had a huge impact on the 
Chinese retail industry (CCFA, 2010). The company introduced the hypermarket (大卖场) to 
the country and opened a number of stores in China. By 2006, there were 1,833 French operated 
companies in China including Auchan, a French large-scale retailer. However, when the boycott 
of French products began in April 2008, Carrefour was received great attention of the Chinese 
media, and a number of Chinese went to the store and protested. The boycott originated from an 
incident during the Beijing Olympic 2008 torch relay held in Paris (“Karuhu-ru”, 2008). Several 
campaigners for Tibetan independence tried to grab the torch from the disabled female torch 
bearer, Jin Jing. After hearing the news, many Chinese people began to boycott French goods 
and Carrefour. It is notable that the company is becoming a part of Chinese people’s lives 
instead of being merely a foreign retailer. Ito-Yokado on the other hand, did not rank as high as 
Carrefour; however, its unit-store sales are the highest among all retailers thanks to its dominant 
strategy. According to Seven & i’s official corporate outline 2010, dominance strategy has 
certain advantages: increasing visibility by customers, making effective production sites, 
efficient promotion, building effective logistical systems, increasing efficiency advice to 
affiliated stores, and discouraging competitors from launching into the market (p.14). The 
company has a reputation for a high quality of service compared to other retailers, including the 
Japanese retailer JUSCO. Carrefour and Ito-Yokado both have had success in the Chinese retail 
market with different management strategies. How did they make this happen? This paper will 
look at their management strategy from two perspectives: store launch strategy and human 
resource strategy. Store launch strategy is the clearest way to observe the company’s overall 
strategy. The speeds of opening stores, localization of products and the relationship between 
local governments are related to a company’s corporate culture, and these can show us how 
important the market is to the company. Moreover, it also relates to human resource strategy. In 
2008, the competition among retail enterprises shifted from competition over speed of opening 
stores and their locations to competition for business and human resource management. Since a 
number of foreign retailers have been in the Chinese retailer market for several years or as long 
as a decade, some of them have already gained wider recognition. The current challenge for 
them is not merely opening new stores but also educating and keeping good talent. It is 
necessary to investigate their store launch strategy and human resource management so as to 
understand more about their management strategies. 
The paper will firstly discuss how Chinese retail changed for various reasons and how this 
affected the market penetration of foreign retail companies. In the second section, the paper will 
introduce the corporate history of Carrefour and Ito-Yokado and describe their management 
principles. Thirdly, the paper will investigate the two companies’ store launch strategies and 
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 human resource (HR) strategies in China. In the final section, the paper will summarize the 
arguments presented and make several suggestions. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
Among various kinds of strategies that a company practices when they decide to enter an 
overseas market, market entry strategy and HR strategy play an important role in determining 
their success. The early literature on market entry strategy fails to fully explain the success or 
failure of a foreign company in terms of the background of the country’s economy, its policy and 
the relationship with local government. Although there are many works that have been done on 
HR strategy, few of them analyze the reasons for insufficient localization by the company, and 
they tend to focus more on localization’s advantages than its negative effects. Management 
practice by Carrefour in China has been studied by many scholars and journalists; however, most 
of them only look at localization’s bright side, and ignore its hidden problems. Moreover, few of 
them investigate the relationship between its management principle and its practices. Work on 
Ito-Yokado China is mainly based on interviews and observation from the outside; it is not deep 
enough to understand the company’s management practice in China. 
Foreign market entry strategy has mainly been studied from two perspectives; one is market 
selection and the other is market entry mode. According to Erramilli (1991), there are several 
important aspects for a company to consider when entering a foreign market, which are market 
size and market growth, competition, servicing costs, and the host country’s social, political and 
economic environment (p.480). He chooses over a hundred United States-based service firms 
and finds the more experience a company has in market entry, the more it will tend to select 
unfamiliar markets (Erramilli, 1991, p. 494). However, he conducts the research only by 
questionnaire, which includes various kinds of industries, and it ignores each company’s 
uniqueness. Toba (2003) analyzes the overseas market entry strategy of Carrefour in terms of the 
development in their national market, the background of each entry and its process, and finds out 
that the company has a flexible entry strategy, adapting the entry mode to every local market. 
Yahagi (2007) analyzes the management strategies of a Japanese retailer, AEON, in terms of 
store launch strategy, entry mode and the speed of opening new stores in China. He concludes 
that the company mainly practices dominant strategy and points out the company opened stores 
relatively slowly because of its lack of internationalization strategy and insufficient organization 
to achieve the goal. However, both of them ignore the relationship between local government of 
the country entered and the company, which might be the key to refining its strategy. There is 
also an argument that Carrefour’s success in Taiwan is because the company rented land instead 
of buying it, which was its first attempt to do so in an overseas market (Shou, 2003). From this 
point of view, we could consider whether Carrefour’s success in China is also because of its 
unique strategy for adapting to the local situation. 
HR strategy has a close connection with market entry strategy, which means that if a 
company opens a number of stores in a relatively short time, it is necessary for them to gain and 
train talent in a short period compared to other companies in which the process of opening stores 
is slower. Moreover, since human capital plays a significant role in a company, they needed to be 
managed with a long-term strategy (Suzuki 2007, p.14). The study of HRM mainly focuses on 
the multi-national company’s point of view which is known as international human resource 
management, IHRM. Works done on IHRM tend to focus on the relationship between parent-
national headquarters and subsidiary, and the localization of HRM in overseas market. Western 
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 companies are compared with Western competitors or Asian companies, which tend to be 
Japanese companies. Scholars usually find that Japanese companies tend to send many 
expatriates to the top management class in subsidiaries, suggesting they are more ethnocentric 
than their Western competitors (Kopp, 1994 and Tung, 1982). There is also an argument that 
with the increase of local employees with high educational background, there will be more 
Japanese expatriates since the level of product, technology and service will be higher in the 
subsidiaries and they needs more parent-nationals to transfer that knowledge (Shiraki 2005, pp. 
92-93). Those publications reached their conclusion mainly by looking at statistics and by large-
scale questionnaires, ignoring the characteristics of each company and its markets. Some 
scholars argue that Japanese MNCs are advancing their localization in overseas markets. 
Beamish and Inkpen (1998) find that Japanese companies reduce the number of expatriates 
because of the limited supply of available position and the recognition of the significance of 
transferring authority to local management. This is a reliable and recent trend of Japanese 
companies; however, they fail to explain the process of the recognition, which might be 
significant for understanding the company’s strategies.  
Along with China’s growth in economy power, there have also been more and more studies 
on the HRM of foreign companies in the Chinese market in recent years. Works on HRM of 
Japanese companies focus more on manufacturers than other industries, such as automobile 
companies, general trade companies, electronics firms, etc. (Seki and Han 2003, Huruta 2004 
and Legewie 2000). Most of them criticize the lack of localization of HRM by Japanese 
companies, which contribute to their failure in the Chinese market. Scholars who have 
investigated management practice of Japanese retailers in China have come to almost the same 
conclusion as the former (Yahagi 2007 and Hu 2003). Although they reached the similar 
conclusion that there is a lack of localization of HRM in Japanese companies, they did not fully 
explain what determines their HRM strategy.      
Among various types of foreign companies in China, research on Carrefour and Ito-Yokado 
has concentrated on different aspects, the former as the second-largest retailer which advances its 
localization in China; the latter as the retailer with the highest unit-store sales in the Chinese 
market for several years.  
The study of Carrefour’s overseas management practice can be divided into two parts, which 
are the Western market and the Asian market. In the Western market, Rugman and Girod (2003) 
point out that since the percentage of total sales by Carrefour in the non-Western market is much 
lower than in the Western market, therefore, the company should be analyzed as a regional 
company. Although this is true, we should not ignore the company’s expectations in other 
markets. Bianchi and Ostale (2006) investigate the failure of Carrefour and other large-scale 
TNCs in Chile, and they conclude that they failed because they did not adapt their retail practices 
and retail format to the local context. However, they did not fully explain why those companies 
failed to localize in these markets. Besides Chile, Carrefour also failed in Japan and South Korea. 
Aoyama (2007) compares the management practices of Carrefour and Wal-Mart in Japan and 
concludes that their over-emphasis on low prices and underestimation of the effect of 
localization caused their failure. According to Coe and Wrigley (2007), after the comparison 
made between Carrefour and Tesco in South Korea, the former failed to succeed because of the 
lack of good partnership with local companies. However, a problem with those studies is that 
they oversimplified the issues contributing to the failures.  
Although Carrefour had failed in certain other markets, it had success in China. It has mainly 
been studied in terms of its flexible management strategy. According to Ko (2003), one of the 
International Journal of Business Anthropology vol. 3(1) 2012     137
 reasons that Carrefour succeeded in China was its flexible strategy to open stores across the 
country by getting permission from local government instead of central government.   However, 
Ko fails to investigate how they could achieve that, which may relate to localization of HRM. 
Kanazaki, Yamamoto and Shimizu (2006) argue that in China Carrefour flexibly utilizes the 
experience of their employees, who had experience all over the world, and who play a role of 
transformation of knowledge. They also emphasize that Carrefour gives enough personnel 
authority to the local level. However, they reached this conclusion only by conducting a few 
interviews with French employees instead of local employees. 
In comparison to the literature on Carrefour China, fewer studies have been done on Ito-
Yokado China. The company’s management practice in the Chinese market was mainly studied 
in terms of the control of products’ quality, adapting to the need of local customers and the high 
quality of service (Su 2000, Wei 2004 and Zhao 2010). Most of them agree with the 
effectiveness of practicing the management of products in the company, such as “Tanpin Kanri (
単品管理)”, which was made to avoid lack of stock, discount and abolition of products. The 
store changes the floor layout or the number of new arrived products according to the weather. 
The high quality of service made Chengdu people feel like “emperors” (Zhao, 2010). It is worth 
mentioning that Ito-Yokado Chengdu tends to be paid more attention than the one in Beijing 
since Ito-Yokado’s Chengdu stores have the highest average total sales in China. According to 
statistics by CCFA, average total sales of each store in Chengdu are 117,126 RMB and Ito-
Yokado Chengdu is ranked top in terms of each store’s sales. Those works have carried out little 
fundamental investigation into the issue and have over simplified Ito-Yokado’s success. There 
are also some other studies which compare Ito-Yokado to Western competitors in terms of entry 
strategy and HRM (Hu, 2003 and Ko, 2003). However, they fail to explain why there is a 
difference between them. Besides those publications, there is also a former executive in the 
company who joined the planning for entering into the Chinese market and describes its process 
very thoroughly, which is valuable information (Henmi, 2008). 
This paper will first describe the change of the Chinese retail market and its current situation 
for understanding Carrefour and Ito-Yokado’s foreign market strategy. Then the paper will 
introduce Carrefour and Ito-Yokado’s historical development and management principles, which 
play an important role in their management practices. The paper will investigate the market entry 
strategy and HR strategy by these two retailers respectively in terms of relationship with the 
government and localization. Finally, it will compare the two companies’ market entry strategy 




Human capital plays a significant role since it has the power to decide a company’s 
management strategy. In order to understand the issue of market entry strategy and HR strategy 
more deeply, it is necessary to conduct interviews both with employees who work at the store 
and those who work at headquarters. Interviews reveal more about the process of store operation, 
the relationship among local employees and the relationship between Japanese expatriates and 
local employees. Moreover, it develops a deeper rapport with the people in the company which 
may result in them opening up more to the author, allowing the author to see and understand 
more than they might have as an outsider simply observing the company. It is insufficient to 
merely interview employees in one city, since each of them has a different retail trade area and 
customers. For Carrefour, I selected three cities located in the north and the south of China, 
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 which have different consumption habits. For Ito-Yokado, the author was only able to contact 
employees in Beijing and in Japan (see Table 1).  
 
TABLE 1 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FROM 2007 TO 2008 IN CHINA AND JAPAN 
 
Year Date City Company Interviewee Nationality Sex Age Department Position
8/28 Changsha Carrefour A China M 40s Customer Service Department Manager
9/4 Shenzhen Carrefour B China M 30s Security Department Manager
9/10 Dalian Carrefour C China F 20s Consumer Goods Former Assistant Division Chief
8/8 Tokyo Ito-Yokado D Japan M 60s Customer Service Former Director and Department Manager
9/2 Beijing Ito-Yokado E China M 40s Textile Former Director 
9/2 Beijing Ito-Yokado F China F 40s Human Resource Former Division Chief
9/4 Changsha Carrefour G China M 40s Customer Service Department Manager
9/4 Changsha Carrefour H China F 30s Human Resource Department Chief
9/10 Beijing Ito-Yokado I China F 30s Secretary of Store Manager
9/10 Beijing Ito-Yokado J China F 40s Store Manager
9/10 Beijing Ito-Yokado K China F 40s Human Resource Department Chief
9/12 Dalian Carrefour L China M 30s Fresh Former Assistant Division Chief





In the 2007 interviews, I mainly asked about each store’s basic information, its staffing, 
training and evaluating methods. Most of the interviewees were executives from different 
departments. The following year, I was able to interview people both from Carrefour and Ito-
Yokado Beijing. The majority of interviewees were in their thirties or forties, and most of them 
were managers. It is necessary to mention that most of the interviewees from Ito-Yokado worked 
in the human resources department, and some of them had already worked for more than ten 
years, which was not the case at Carrefour. 
 
REFORM AND OPENING-UP IN THE CHINESE RETAIL INDUSTRY 
 
China shifted from a planned economy system to a market economy due to reforms in 1978. 
After the reform and opening-up, retail regulations mainly revolve around the concept of the 
socialist market economy, which has helped develop the Chinese retail market. The development 
of Chinese retail regulations can be divided into four phases. From 1949 to 1978, Chinese retail 
merely played the role of distributor, distributing goods in accordance with the state plan. 
Factories and stores were all owned and operated by the state. Although the intensively planned 
economy had a positive effect to some extent, it also caused the uneven distribution of 
productive forces. From 1978 to 1991, the retail market in China was in the starting stage. In this 
phase, individual enterprises were starting to occupy the market and replace state-run companies. 
In 1979, the Chinese government divided companies with collective ownership from nationalized 
companies. There were three types of company for foreign companies that wanted to enter into 
the Chinese market: Sino-foreign joint venture, Sino-foreign cooperative enterprise and single 
proprietorship. However, before July, 1992, no foreign company was allowed to enter the 
Chinese retail market in principle. The so-called number 82 document was enacted in July, 1992, 
which allowed one or two foreign retailers to enter into six cities and five special economic 
zones. The six cities were Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Guangzhou, Dalian and Qingdao, and the 
five special economic zones Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, Xiamen, and Hainan. However, single 
proprietorship was not allowed at that time. In August, 1997, the central government 
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 promulgated a notice which required local government to clean-up and rectify (整理整顿) listed 
foreign retailers that they had already approved to enter their markets. Clean-up and rectify 
means that the government investigates foreign retailers and if they are found to be breaking the 
law, the government will deal with the problem. At the same time, the central government 
increased the range of locations in which foreign retailers were allowed to open new stores. A 
notice that was enacted in July clarified the allowed operating period of forty-two foreign 
retailers, and there were 199 retailers that needed to be cleaned-up and rectified. However, there 
were still many foreign retailers operating illegally in China, numbering 251 by 2001 according 
to a notice from central government enacted in August 2001. Carrefour was one of them, and the 
government required the company’s subsidiary in Chengdu to leave the Chinese market. After 
China entered the World Trade Organization, the retail regulation gradually relaxed so that more 
foreign retailers could enter into the market, which made competition severe. In 2003, the 
Chinese government said that it would promulgate a provisional measure that would divide 
foreign retailers into three categories (A to C) so as to rule and manage them. Companies ranked 
A are those which have never broken rules; B-ranked companies have broken rules before but 
corrected afterwards; C-ranked companies still break rules. Companies ranked C would not have 
permission to enter into new areas of business or open new stores. Carrefour would probably 
have been ranked C at that time. However, in February 2004, the government decided not to 
promulgate the measure since most of the B ranked and C ranked companies promised to 
observe regulations and obey laws. Another provisional measure was enacted by the Chinese 
government on 16th April 2004, which greatly relaxed the limitation of the scope of business and 
the type of company. It allowed foreign retailers to do business in any place and it also reduced 
the capital of companies. Although the measure still leaves some problems to be resolved, it can 
be seen that the Chinese retail market is moving towards universal opening for foreign retailers.     
     The retail industry’s role as a mere distributor underwent great changes after reform and 
opening-up. From 1978 to 1991, Chinese retail mainly consisted of large-scale department 
stores. From 1992, and especially from 1996, there were various types of retailer in the market. 
According to the Commerce Department of the Chinese government, in 2004 there were 
seventeen categories of business, which were divided into businesses with stores and those 
without stores. In recent years, retailers with domestic-investment have dominated the market, 
most of which are private companies. According to the list of “Chinese chain stores top 100” in 
2009 published by the China Chain Store & Franchise Association, local electrical appliance 
companies dominated the top three. Some companies increased by 28% and 34% in terms of 
total sales and the number of stores compared to the previous year. Among the top 10, seven 
were electrical appliance companies and others were department stores or supermarkets, 
including foreign retailers that have had more presence recently. Foreign retailers are also 
starting to open new stores in medium-sized or small cities. For example, the speed of opening 
new stores in those cities by Wal-Mart had increased by 67% in 2009. Carrefour also had the 
same strategy, and seven out of their twenty new stores were opened in medium or small cities. 
Since the Chinese retail market has opened to outsiders, the competition among retailers has 
become so fierce that some companies have begun an M&A strategy in order to expand their 
business, which means that a few large companies have come to dominate the retail market. 
Foreign retailers have also merged with and acquired Chinese and Taiwanese retailers in recent 
years. Wal-Mart acquired the Chinese retailer Trust-Mart in 2006. Tesco bought a 90% share of 
Hymall in 2007.  
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 According to the Teikoku databank, there are 10,778 Japanese companies operating in the 
Chinese market and 42.4% of them are manufacturers (Teikoku Databank, 2004). From the size 
of the company, small-and-medium-sized enterprises, SME, where the number of employees is 
from ten to fifty, has reached 32.9%.  From 1985 to 1996, Japanese small and medium sized 
textile companies entered into the Chinese market, and from 1997, larger scale electronic firms, 
manufactures and retailers gradually increased. Japanese companies tended to see the Chinese 
market merely as a manufacturing base in the beginning; however, because of market saturation 
in Japan, weaker domestic demand and the growth of Chinese market, they now tend to have 
greater expectations from the market and have increased investment (Masuyama, 2004). A 
variety of industries began to operate their business after China joined the WTO. Since the 
opening of the Chinese market to foreign companies, the competition is fierce among many 
fields of businesses. A statistic targeted to Japanese SMEs shows that they plan to open more 
stores or factories inland instead of in coastal cities (Organization for Small & Medium 
Enterprises and Regional Innovation, 2010, p.145). Moreover, they place emphasis on the lack of 
human capital and the increase of salary as main problems that need to be solved in the near 
future. The retail market has also opened up and a number of foreign companies opened stores in 
China. By the end of 2010, there were five Japanese large-scale retailers operating in China; 
Seven & I holdings (including Ito-Yokado), AEON, ISETAN, Uniqlo and Heiwado. Although 
Heiwado only does business in Changsha, Hunan province, all the others have stores in more 
than two cities.  
 




Carrefour was established in France in 1959 by Marcel Fournier, Jacques Defforey and his 
brother, Denis Defforey. The group first introduced the hypermarket to the world in 1963. 
Carrefour expanded its influence in France. Because of the market saturation inside the country 
and the law regulating the group opening new stores, the group started to increase the pace of 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A), diversify its business, entering into areas such as credit cards 
and insurance, and entered into overseas markets at the same time. The group opened its first 
overseas store in Belgium in 1969 and entered into the Brazilian market in 1975. Carrefour 
opened its first Asian store in Taiwan in 1989. Besides hypermarkets, the group operated hard-
discount stores and supermarkets around the world. A hard-discount store is “a self-service store, 
smaller than a supermarket, with a limited set of products and simple presentation, with low 
prices and mostly non-branded products.” (Gutman, 2002, p. 410) After the acquisition of 
Promodès in 1999, which had a variety of stores, such as hypermarket (Continent, closed in 
2000), supermarket (Champion), hard discount (Dia), convenience store (Shopi, Codec, etc.), 
cash and carry (Promocash and Puntocash), the group became the second largest retailer in the 
world.  
Carrefour clarifies its management principles in terms of “Our Missions”, “Our Values” and 
“Our Policies” (Shiraki 2006, p.23). Top priority in “Our Mission” is to rank among the top 
three; otherwise, it will leave the market. Authorizing as much power as possible to the local 
level plays a significant role in “Our Values” (Carrefour Group 2006, p.6). In “Our Policies”, the 
company emphasizes the importance of hiring more executives from outside and of holding 
executive conferences regularly for sharing their experiences. 
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 Ito-Yokado 
The uncle of Masatoshi Ito, honorary chairman of Ito-Yokado founded the procurer of the 
company “Yokado Yohinten (洋華堂洋品店)” in 1920. The family moved to another place since 
the company was bombed out during the Second World War. In 1956, Masatoshi took over the 
operation of the company and established “Yokado (洋華堂)” in April, 1958. During the sixties, 
department stores had a lead in Japanese retail industry. Besides Ito-Yokado, many GMS, Daiei, 
Seiyu, Jusco and Uny were established around that time. In 1973, the total sales of Daiei 
surpassed those of Mitsukoshi, a department store. Ito-Yokado became number one in 1980, and 
stands firm with a steady business model that has aspired to high revenue and high efficiency 
from the beginning.  
Because of the law that regulated the opening of new GMS stores, market saturation and the 
bursting of the bubble, some GMS went bankrupt, such as Yaohan, Nagasakiya, etc. Aside from 
these circumstances, since Ito-Yokado could not respond to the rapid change of the market, the 
company needed to change the management plan so that the restructuring work started. Top 
executives did not overlook the problems faced by the company. Masatoshi inspected Western 
retailers overseas, and decided upon the regular chain strategy, which means headquarters has 
the authority to manage stores directly. Several years later, the company’s name was changed to 
Ito-Yokado. The company started to enter the overseas market in China in 1996. The company 
did not enter into any overseas market since then. The company’s sales lost its lead to AEON in 
2003 and 2004, and the earning capacity of its affiliate company 7-eleven Japan surpassed its 
parent company, Ito-Yokado. A new company Seven & i Holdings Co., Ltd. was established in 
2005 and Ito-Yokado became its affiliate company. According to the official data provided at the 
end of 2009, Seven & i Holdings Co., Ltd. is now the largest retailer in Japan and fourteenth in 
the world.  
On the official website of Ito-Yokado, the company described its motto (社是) clearly as 
below. 
 
We would like to be an honest company, which customers trust. 
We would like to be an honest company, which business partners, stake holders, 
communities trust.  
We would like to be an honest company, which employees trust. 
 
Ito-Yokado placed an emphasis on “honest” and “trust”. It seems that the company still 
stands for the founder of Ito-Yokado, Masatoshi Ito’s beliefs, which were “follow the rules” and 
“hold on to the company’s core business”. According to Henmi (2008), the company is well 
known for their work restructuring (業務改革) which began from eighties and had great positive 
influence on the company. It is actually a restatement and development of the basic requirements 
towards employees, and it consists of three elements: eliminating slow sellers, hypothesis and 
verification, and giving authority to the local level. “Tanpin Kanri (単品管理)” is one of the 
important subjects of the restructure. The company gives authority to part-time employees to 
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 STORE LAUNCH STRATEGY BY CARRFEOUR AND ITO-YOKADO IN CHINA 
 
Carrefour  
When a company expands its business into an overseas market, it usually has two factors: 
one is a “pull” factor; the other is a “push” factor (Toba, 2003, p.64). There are two push factors 
that prompted Carrefour to enter into overseas markets. One factor is market saturation, which 
was caused by M&A by national large corporations in France. For instance, in 2000, the ten 
largest corporations dominated more than half of the market share (Toba 2003). Another factor is 
the restriction of opening new large-scale stores in France. Carrefour only opened fifteen new 
stores from 1999 to 2007 in consequence of the Royer Law (1973) and the Raffarin Law (1996). 
The pull factor for Carrefour is due to success in Taiwan and an increased Chinese gross 
domestic product, and the expansion of the retail industry in China. Firstly, the success of 
Carrefour in Taiwan was mainly due to two points, one is choosing the right partner, and the 
other is the localization of HRM. There were French store managers in the beginning, however, 
local store managers increased in number. Moreover, the company gave them a free hand in 
deciding products’ price and which supplier they use. They are also in charge of recruitment and 
of negotiating the salary with employees. Many Taiwanese store managers have been transferred 
to mainland China.  
Although Carrefour was ranked seventh among retailers in China in 2010, the company did 
not have the good start. The company entered into the Chinese market without any official 
permission; but Makro (Netherland) and Ito-Yokado (Japan) did obtain permission. However, the 
company opened stores without breaking the law in the beginning. According to Ko (2003), in 
1995, in order to open stores in Beijing, the group firstly established a consulting corporation, 
which was not against the law, with a Chinese company and notionally let the company run their 
store, Chuangyijia Shangcheng (创益佳商城 ). However, Carrefour had real management 
authority to operate the store. 
Carrefour speeded up opening new stores from 2004 and it had more than 170 hypermarkets 
in China by 2011 (see figure 1). The company was banned from opening new stores in China 
from 2001 to 2002 because of the law which was implemented in August 2001 by central 
government. After solving the problem with the government, the company has continued opening 
more stores since then. Besides hypermarkets, the group introduced supermarkets and hard-
discount stores. Although Carrefour operated 268 hard-discount stores in China by the end of 
2009, the group’s supermarket, Champion (冠军超市), left the market in 2005.   
Carrefour started opening more stores in suburban areas instead of in big cities due to severe 
competition. For example, the company opened world’s 1000th store in Tongzhou (通州), near 
Beiijng, which is the first suburban store. Carrefour also started to enter into inland areas and the 
North East area. The company also localizes products. For example, 60% of grocery and clothing 
are procured from local sellers in the first store in Xinjiang. Moreover, half of manufactured food 
in the store accommodates local people’s tastes. Besides cooperating with famous or big 
manufacturers, Carrefour also procured goods from farmers directly. A manager from Carrefour 
said that this not only increases farmer’s salaries but also allows Carrefour to keep good quality 
with low price. 
Besides the above, many Chinese professors and journalists argue about Carrefour’s Chinese 
name “jia le fu (家乐福)” and almost all of them think it is nice and very localized. It is actually 
the same as the name used by Taiwan Carrefour, and its slogan means enjoy happy shopping in 
Carrefour (开心购物家乐福). In recent years, Carrefour started a new slogan which is happy at 
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 home (福到家). Happy (福) refers to many things, such as fortune, good luck, and it is a very 
important value of the Chinese people. Home (家) means the home of customers, employees and 
suppliers. Therefore, happy at home (福到家 ) means to have shopping in Carrefour. The 
company also made a new rule that if you buy cheaper products in other retail stores, you could 
get quintuple refund for the difference. It is worth mentioning that every time Carrefour opened a 
new store, started new slogan, or other changed its president, the Chinese media always reports 
this on the internet, and the frequency of this is higher than other foreign retailers. Although there 
has also been negative news about the company, it might be true that Carrefour is good at 
attracting not only journalists’ attention but also that of local government. 
 
FIGURE 1  





There are two pull factors for Ito-Yokado; one is the growth of the Chinese economy and the 
other is the invitation from central government. Firstly, the increase of Gross National Product 
(GNP), the expansion of the Chinese retail industry and people’s high living standard attracted 
many foreign retailers to enter the Chinese market. Secondly, the Chinese government asked 
foreign retailers to open stores in China. For Japanese retailers, Ito-Yokado, Daiei and Yaohan 
were candidates. The central government wanted one of them to help the country to modernize 
the Chinese retail industry. According to interviewee D, Ito-Yokado was chosen as one of 
foreign retailers at the end because of its strong sales in Japan and its know-how. The central 
government thought that although Yaohan had a high loyalty, the company had little know-how. 
The Chinese government also wanted to attract an American retailer, K-Mart; however, the 
company rejected the proposal since it had a huge domestic market at that time. Until October 
1995, the central government allowed two foreign retailers to enter the market, and each had a 
Chinese joint partner, including Ito-Yokado. The company partnered with China National Sugar 
& Wines Group Corporation (中国糖业酒类集团公司). According to interviewee D, although 
the founder did not reject the proposal, he was very cautious about the decision since he thought 
that the company could not afford to fail. However, President Suzuki decided within one week to 
enter the Chinese market. Ito-Yokado expanded its business into the Chinese market mainly 
because of two push factors. Firstly, by entering the Chinese market, they wanted to cultivate 
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 employees’ spirit of an international sense of business since it was the first time that the 
company opened an overseas store, and top executives thought it would help employees to get to 
know more about international business. Secondly, Ito-Yokado’s management team thought that 
China could support Japanese business as merchandise procurement. Ito-Yokado was the first 
foreign company which had the right to open a far-reaching chain throughout the country. 
Ito-Yokado established a subsidiary in Chengdu, China in 1996. The company chose an 
inland city because of two reasons; one was the connection with the Japanese trading company 
Itochu, which is the company’s biggest business partner, and the other was the local 
government’s great effort. According to Li (2008), there is a well-known story called the “flying 
bike story” (p. 40). It says that although the process of opening new company took several 
months at that time, the mayor of Sichuan province gave an order to complete all documents in 
one day and it became true. In the next year, the company founded an affiliated company in 
Beijing. According to the data from the company’s official website, Ito-Yokado had nine stores in 
Beijing and four in Chengdu, total of thirteen stores in China by June 2010. Based on the 
Chinese retail statistics in 2009, the total sales of Ito-Yokado Chengdu was ranked sixty-two; 
however, the average of each Ito-Yokado (Chengdu) store’s sales was RMB11.7 hundred million, 
which was the highest among foreign retailers. Ito-Yokado was one of the most popular 
companies in Chengdu; moreover, it maintained a high growth rate of 20% each year. 
Ito-Yokado opened stores based on their dominant strategy, which makes the company open 
new stores at a relatively slow speed. Although Ito-Yokado opened new stores at a relatively 
slow speed, the company accelerated the rate of opening stores in recent years. By 1 June 2010, 
the company operated 12 stores in China. After opening the first store in 1998, Ito-Yokado 
opened a second store in Beijing three years later. From 2001 to 2004, the company opened a 
new store every two years, but from 2005, Ito-Yokado opened its fifth and sixth stores in one 
year. On the other hand, it seems that Chengdu Ito-Yokado opened new stores at a very slow 
speed compared to Beijing, which hosted the Olympic games; however, the fourth store is 
supposed to open in three years, which is faster than the second one, in five years, and the third 
one, in four years. Thanks to Ito-Yokado’s dominant strategy, the total sales of Beijing and 
Chengdu were increasing. In 1999, sales in both Beijing and Chengdu were almost same; 
however, because of the speedy expansion in Beijing, the company’s total sales were ahead of 
those of Chengdu.  
The company localizes its products. It gets 100% of clothing and 95% of fresh food from 
China (Li, 2008, p. 46). Moreover, the company operated as a department store in China and the 
good reputation attracted many stores to move in, which is called the shops in the store (店中店) 
business model. Ito-Yokado had done its best to make the atmosphere in the stores adjust to local 
resident’s preferences and customs so that they introduced some corporate customs. One 
important custom is that they change shop floor’s layout according to the weather. They do not 
only check the weather one time a day, but every hour and employees can see the weather map 
the way to the staff room. They also capture the different fashions of people in Beijing and 
Chengdu. According to interviewee D, people in Beijing like to wear relatively dark colors; 
however, Chengdu residents tend to wear bright colors, therefore they procure accordingly. The 
company went to great efforts to satisfy their customers. Unlike Carrefour, Ito-Yokado has little 
media exposure; interviewee D said that “We want to help modernizing the Chinese retail and 
introduce the high quality of service, not to promote our self.” Mr. Saegusa, the president of 
Chengdu Ito-Yokado, said to the local newspaper that “We do not want to compete with others; 
the important thing is to guide and investigate inside the company and challenge our self”.  
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 HUMAN RESOURCE STRATEGY BY CARRFOUR AND ITO-YOKADO 
 
Carrefour 
Carrefour China was divided into four areas: central-west, east, south and north. Each area’s 
headquarters was located in Shanghai, Chengdu, Guangzhou and Beijing respectively. They had 
power for purchasing, marketing, finance, and press relations. However, along with the tendency 
towards centralization in recent years, the organizational structure and their authority might have 
changed. 
Carrefour’s stores were composed of the commercial department, which has five departments 
(Consumer Goods, Fresh Bazaar, Appliance and Textile), and the service department. In each 
department, there were five levels of position: regular employee, assistant department chief, 
department chief, department manager and store manager.  
 
Recruitment 
Each store was able to recruit executives without waiting for approval from branch offices. 
Employees were mainly regular employees with one or two year contracts, with few internships 
and part-timers. Carrefour recruited employees through the internet or at job fairs in the 
community or at schools. Internship and part-time employees could be found mostly from job 
seeking websites. In order to attract more top-level staff, Carrefour tended to hire executive 
candidates from university job fairs. The company hired regular employees as cashiers directly 
from job fairs in the community. The qualifications required for Carrefour’s regular employees 
had several common points, which were age from 20s to 30s with a relatively “modest” 
education level, such as junior high school, technical secondary school (中专), and high school 
to secondary vocational technical school (职业中专). However, the company required applicants 
for executive candidate positions to have a diploma, which varied from junior college (大专) to 
university, and English ability. Carrefour emphasized English ability because executives above 
departmental manager were supposed to share experiences with foreigners at regular conferences 
as declared in “Our Policies”. According to interviewee G, strong English ability had a positive 
influence on their promotion.   
Applicants needed to conduct interviews which had four steps. After applicants sent their 
resumes to HR, an employee from the department would interview them. The next interview 
would be held in several days with the department manager. A final interview was conducted 
with the store manager. Interviewers mainly observed how applicants handled the problems they 
were presented with, how much they cared about the importance of teamwork, and whether they 
followed their superiors. 
 
Training 
Carrefour placed emphasis on recruiting more employees from the younger generation 
(Chen, 2007). Due to the high speed of opening new stores, the company struggled to find 
sufficient executives. It was not easy since an employee needs a minimum of six years to become 
a store manager. In order to gain qualified executives, the company strengthened training 
programs from June 2005 (An, 2006). 
This paper focuses on executive training, which is significant for the company. Carrefour had 
two levels of training centers; one was national and the other regional. The “Carrefour China 
Institute (CCI)” in Shanghai was the national level training center, which was established in 
March 2000. It mainly trained store manager candidates and district manager candidates. Other 
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 candidates took training in the regional training centers, which were located in each city or 
prefecture. Executive training mainly had three types, which were division manager candidates 
(Executive Training Program, ETP), department manager candidates (Management Development 
Program, MDP) and store manager candidates (Carrefour Mandarin Training, CMT). For ETP, 
Carrefour recruited the majority of candidates from outside, and they were required to have a 
diploma and English ability. For example, among eleven candidates for Chengdu ETP assessed 
in April 2004, more than 80% had a bachelor’s degree, and others had a master’s degree. 
Moreover, the company tried to hire more employees who are from the local area. In the Tianjin 
ETP recruitment during May, 2004, all candidates had graduated from local schools. 
Carrefour emphasized the training program for store manager trainees. For instance, CMT 
increased five times in 2006 compared to 2000. Moreover, the company promoted sixty more 
local people to store manager in 2007. In some cities, such as Wuhan and Guangzhou, all store 
managers or even district managers were Chinese who were their 30’s. This shows that Carrefour 
recruits and promotes local young people. The company recruited more local people and 
increased their training for accelerating the promotion process in order to have sufficient 
qualified executives in China. An executive from headquarters of the company declared that it 
plans to allow Chinese managers to run the business from 2018. 
 
Evaluation 
Employees were mainly evaluated by their attendance and job performance. Job performance 
was evaluated during the apprenticeship period and at the end of that year. It contained various 
factors, such as work attitude, accomplishment, teamwork, observance of rules, etc. Employees 
had a second chance when they failed the first time.  
Compensation included basic compensation, reward and allowance. A person in charge in 
each department had the right to decide the details and amount of the reward. The company 
strictly banned employees from sharing details of their compensation with other people, and 
those who disobeyed would suffer punishment. Carrefour’s compensation, especially executives, 
was ranked in the middle class in China. However, according to Bin (2003), assistant division 
managers only got around RMB 2,000 to RMB 3,500. According to the data collected in 2008, a 
store manager’s monthly compensation was around RMB 50,000 to RMB 60,000, and an 
assistant store manager got RMB 20,000 a month. Each executive’s compensation was quite 
different and this could be a factor in motivating employees.      
 
Ito-Yokado 
According to the official website of Ito-Yokado Chengdu, the company had headquarters of 
operation, management, finance, and information system, a total of four headquarters. I will 
briefly introduce the operation and management headquarters, which have various kinds of 
departments. In operation headquarters, there are the departments of commerce and sales. Each 
department had some people to control the store and its products (店舗統括 and 商品統括). 
Other than those departments, the company also had departments of industrial education, 
industrial development, internet supermarket, Supervision (SV), distribution, customer service 
and sales promotion (SP). In management headquarters, there are the departments of develop-
ment, human resource, general affairs, quality management and foreign affairs. There is also a 
department which controls management (管理統括).     
Ito-Yokado’s stores had a commercial department (Clothing, Housing and Food) and a 
service department until 2007. In the commercial department, positions were classified into five 
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 levels: regular employee, chief, director, manager, and store manager. In the service department, 
it was classified into three levels: regular employee, director and manager. In this paper, 
“executive” means an employee who ranked above department chief in a commercial department 
or above chief in the service department. 
 
Recruitment 
The person in charge of each department worked together with the department of human 
resources for recruitment. In Ito-Yokado, only headquarters had the right to hire executive 
candidates. The company was composed of permanent staff, interns, and part-timers, and they 
renewed their contracts according to the law. Recruitment will be examined by method and 
qualification. Firstly, each Ito-Yokado store generally found employees by itself through the 
Internet or at job fairs. The Internet was also used to recruit interns from universities and 
colleges and part-time staff. Job fairs were usually held in schools. Ito-Yokado selected 
interview candidates with expertise through school job fairs. Unlike some European 
supermarkets, Ito-Yokado did not tend to hold community job fairs, and hired regular employees 
such as cashiers directly. Secondly, I examined recruitment qualifications both from recruiting 
advertising on Internet and interviews. It can be seen from recruiting advertising that Ito-Yokado 
set higher qualification requirements for executives than for regular employees. On the one hand, 
qualifications for regular employees were with a relatively modest education level. For example, 
they required the employee’s academic background variously to be junior high school, technical 
secondary school, and high school to secondary vocational technical school. On the other hand, 
common qualifications for executives included a relatively high education level and job 
experience. In terms of managerial educational background, although a regular employee with a 
junior high school education could be promoted to management level, the company tended to 
hire executive candidates with a bachelor’s degree. According to interviewee K, a bachelor or 
above degree does not guarantee that the holder is absolutely good at the job; however, people 
who went to higher education institutes have more knowledge than others and they are more 
capable of understanding business contents and regulations than others. Moreover, Ito-Yokado 
tended to promote regular employees to executives from the company so that the company only 
hires from outside when it comes to a pinch. Ito-Yokado did not place too much emphasis on 
Japanese ability since Japanese managers usually have a full-time translator.  
According to interviewee J, Ito-Yokado had four steps for recruitment. First, sending a 
resume to the department of human resource management, where there is a screening. Second, 
some Chinese employees from Ito-Yokado will interview candidates and interviews will include 
the candidate’s understanding of the company’s corporate culture. Third, there is a paper test, 
which examines basic knowledge. Finally, managers from Ito-Yokado, which include Japanese 
staff with translators, interview candidates. The first interview and the second are quite different 
and in the latter one, interviewers ask candidates more specific questions about the company. 
Because of the good reputation of the company, many freshmen apply for the executive positions 




Ito-Yokado is well-known for its high quality service in China. According to 2006 statistics, 
customer satisfaction toward service was ranked the highest (Wang, Li and Lu, 2006). Ito-
Yokado had done its best to make the atmosphere in the stores adjust to local resident’s 
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 references and customs, and had maintained their high-quality service. Therefore, the company 
put great effort into training. The company organizes training for employees so they can gain 
more knowledge about the industry, and so as to transmit its corporate culture. Compared to 
certain Western retailers, Ito-Yokado placed less emphasis on intensive training. According to 
interviewee E, the company transmitted its corporate culture mainly by daily conference. I shall 
talk about the training in different positions first and then I will describe the conferences. Before 
the store opens, for regular employees and executive candidates, the training mainly had two 
parts; one was taking courses for general knowledge at headquarters and the other was practicing 
in genba (現場). For the general part, the company taught employees how to dress appropriately, 
how to bow, facial expressions with customers, and so on. Employees had a printed manual, 
which was based on that of Ito-Yokado Japan. Other than those manners, employees also studied 
the company’s management principles, corporate culture, code of conduct, contract of 
employment and welfare that employees could get. 
In Ito-Yokado, headquarters organized training for executive candidates. They gained 
knowledge about the sales floor, regulation of the company and career planning. For those of 
manager level, common contents of the training were management of the sales floor, application 
of data, sales plans, human resource management, and company strategies. The training lasted 
for two to three months, with classes at headquarters and on-the-job training (OJT) in each store. 
Store manger candidates had the chance to go to Japan for training, which lasted for one week. 
The company organized this training once a year and Japanese ability was not required. The 
characteristic of this training was that most candidates were women; for example, among five 
candidates, four were women in 2008. At the end of the training, participants needed to make a 
presentation at a conference after they went back to China. 
Other than training before the opening of stores, there was also daily training. For example, 
employees who worked in Xizhimen store (西直門店) watched a tape every Tuesday and 
Wednesday. The content was different from time to time, for example, they focused on training 
for security when I did my interview in 2008. Besides training for employees from Ito-Yokado, 
the company trained employees from other shops every Monday and Tuesday at the Xizhimen 
store. Besides formal training, once employees enter the company, they received a handbook. It 
allowed them to gain some knowledge about the company’s corporate culture, the way to behave 
on the shop floor, how to dress properly, how to bow, etc. It was based on Ito-Yokado 
headquarters’ handbook, and employees in the human resource department edited it according to 
the Chinese situation. The difference between Ito-Yokado and Carrefour’s handbook is that the 
former has more pictures and requirements of the way of talking or of behavior. 
The second important way for Ito-Yokado to transmit its corporate culture so as to train 
employees is to have a meeting or a conference. According to Ito-Yokado’s first Chinese store 
manager interviewee E, the company insists on holding a daily conference every morning and 
night. As he described, through the daily conference, the company was able to convince 
employees to believe in their corporate culture, or even “brainwash” them. Moreover, he stressed 
that sharing information between managers and regular employees and daily conferences were 
the most effective way to make that happen. Unlike some retailers who limited the meeting time 
to thirty minutes or cut down the number of meetings, Ito-Yokado still asked managers to 
regularly schedule a meeting (see Table 2). Ito-Yokado tried to pass on information by holding 
meetings every week. According to interviewee E, it was hard to say that all of these meetings 
were useful; however, he believed that it was a process of training and “brainwashing” since 
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 managers repeated the company’s corporate culture when they passed on the information.  
 
TABLE 2 
DAILY CONFERENCE IN ITO-YO-KADO (BEIJING) 
 
Date Time Contents
Morning President, department managers and other executives attend the 
coference about company's operation
Afternoon Department superiors have meeting with their subordinates
Morning Executive meeting
Afternoon Store managers, employees in management class from each 
department attend a meeting hosted by board of directors
Monday Afternoon Executives pass the information from meeting in head quarter to 
employees whose lank is upper than department chief
Wednesday Morning Store mangers pass the information to every employee







Because of the high requirement of the quality of service, some stores did certain kinds of 
punishment recently. According to the local news paper, in May 2010, a store in Beijing 
punished two employees to stand up in the passage way to the staff room and bow every time 
their colleagues passed by for twenty minutes (Beijing Business Today, 26 May, 2010). The 
store manager decided to punish employees who did not obey the rules – for example long hair 
that needed to be tied up, failure to stand up straight on the shop floor, leaving their post and 
chatting with colleagues, using a mobile phone – and he said that it is absolutely not in 
accordance with the company’s requirements. However, according to the news, it had happened 
in other stores and some employees who have been punished in the same way resigned because 
they thought it was a deep insult to the personality. Although some professors and customers do 
not agree with it, executives from Ito-Yokado think that it is just a method to make employees 
obey the rules. Moreover, one way to train employees to bow and greet is letting them stand in 
the passageway to do that. 
 
Evaluation 
The evaluation section is divided into three parts: basic evaluation, compensation system, and 
promotion. Firstly, employees’ attendance was recorded by a clock card. They were required to 
wear uniforms when they punched their time card. According to interviewee F, an employee who 
came late to the store faced a RMB 30 penalty. Compensation was divided into three parts: basic 
compensation, reward and allowance. Although the company tried to make an effort to keep 
good talent, the Chinese tended to move to another company with a higher salary very 
frequently. For example, once when a Chinese department store called New Century Department 
store (新世纪百货) was established in same district as Ito-Yokado, 60 employees left Ito-
Yokado for higher pay. It is true that some of them returned to Ito-Yokado after several years 
because they thought they could learn more from the company; however, compensation always 
was a problem for Japanese companies to gain good talent compared to Western or even 
mainland Chinese competitors. Secondly, a performance assessment is done during the 
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 apprenticeship at the end of the year. It contains various elements, such as work attitude, 
capability, accomplishment, teamwork, and observance of rules. The apprenticeship performance 
assessment is very important since it decides whether the candidate will be hired or not. 
However, even if they fail the assessment, the group will offer them another chance to try. 
Assessment at the end of that year will be appraised by the person in charge of their department, 
and then the human resource department will perform a comprehensive evaluation of the 
assessment. 
The promotion system was questioned by some employees. When I was doing interviews in 
Beijing, many employees said that they were not satisfied with the compensation system since 
the qualifications required for promotion were not clear enough. Moreover, if a Chinese 
employee wanted to be promoted to the core part of the company, they need permission from the 
Japanese top management class, which reduced Chinese employee’s motivation or even caused 
some mainstays of the company to leave. For example, the HR department at headquarters used 
to have the right to assign executives such as department chief, which was ranked lowest in the 
management class; however, it required permission of the vice president and president several 
years later. According to interviewee E, who worked in Ito-Yokado for almost ten years and 
helped the opening of the first store in Beijing, communication with Japanese employees was a 
one-way street. Moreover, he pointed out that Japanese managers were still complacent with past 
success, so it was very hard to implement reforms. However, Ito-Yokado may have some 
changes. A first Chinese executive joined the board in Chengdu Ito-Yokado and she is the only 
female. Beijing Ito-Yokado has Chinese executives; however, one of them, who used to be the 
division head, resigned and moved to a local retailer to be a vice president. Both Ito-Yokado 
Beijing and Chengdu promoted a number of Chinese executives to store manager. Besides 
promotion, Chengdu Ito-Yokado had transferred 220 employees from headquarters to stores and 
vice versa (Wu, 2010). 
Many scholars, economists, and journalists criticize Japanese companies for failing to 
advance localization of HRM in overseas market when compared to Western companies. Ito-
Yokado used to be one of them. Based on interviewee J’s information, among 3,000 permanent 
employees in Ito-Yokado Beijing, there were fifteen Japanese by 2008. Moreover, they held 
eminent positions in the group, such as chairperson or vice-chairperson of the board and store 
manager. However, the situation is changing slightly over time. Although half of their store 
managers in Beijing were Japanese men by 2007, there were six Chinese store managers 
including two females in nine stores by June, 2010, which means Chinese store mangers 
constituted more than half of all store managers. Moreover, although some store managers were 
Japanese, the assistant store managers were all Chinese. We can see that Ito-Yokado is actually 
trying to advance its localization of HRM.     
Ito-Yokado had strict punishment for employees who broke the rules at the shop floor, such 
as using mobile phones, chatting with colleagues, etc. The company imposed a fine on 
employees, and required them to stand still near the entrance for staff saying Welcome to the 
store (欢迎光临) each time when someone passed by. Some employees regarded standing still as 
an insult and refused to obey.  
 
A COMPARISON BETWEEN CARREFOUR AND ITO-YOKADO 
 
Ito-Yokado and Carrefour entered into the Chinese market under different circumstances. 
Firstly, both Carrefour and Ito-Yokado entered into the Chinese market because of its high 
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 economic growth and the development of the Chinese retail industry. They also have other 
factors. On the one hand, Carrefour has a long history and has wide experience operating in 
overseas markets. Their success in Taiwan also prompted the company to enter the Chinese 
market. Although Carrefour did not have the permission of central government for entering into 
the Chinese market, the company had good relationship with local government and this allowed 
the company to open many stores in a relatively short time. This was also based upon one of the 
company’s management principles, which place emphasis on being the top retail store in the 
market. On the other hand, China is the first and only overseas market that Ito-Yokado was 
launched in, and the company also has great expectations as a result. Moreover, according to 
Henmi (2006b), the central government expected Ito-Yokado to introduce advanced technologies 
and customer service. The company truly wanted to help develop the Chinese retail market 
instead of just ranking at the top. Secondly, they have different store formats in China. Ito-
Yokado introduced GMS and operated stores in both Beijing and Chengdu. While Carrefour 
introduced the hypermarket into the Chinese market, the group also operates hard-discount 
stores. Both retailers localize their products. Thirdly, they launched stores in different regions 
and their speed in doing so was quite different. Ito-Yokado seemed to grow more slowly since 
the group only opened stores in two cities in ten years compared to Carrefour which operates 
hundreds of stores not only in big cities but in suburban areas. 
Furthermore, the two retailers operated differently in terms of HR strategy. Firstly, although 
they hire regular employees and executive candidates through similar methods, their strategy in 
personnel authority is quite different. Carrefour gave local people enough authority to recruit 
qualified executives; however, Ito-Yokado restricted this. Secondly, Carrefour tends to place an 
emphasis on intensive training, and is able to train employees near their stores, such as at a 
regional training center. Ito-Yokado, on the other hand, prefers to place great value on daily 
meetings and OJT. Ito-Yokado’s headquarters organized the training every time; Carrefour, by 
contrast divided its training center into two main groups, which are national and regional. 
Finally, their compensation and speed of promotion is different. Although each company’s exact 
salaries are not clear, high salary is one important element in keeping talent. It seems that 
Carrefour is doing better than Ito-Yokado. Since Carrefour is opening many more stores than Ito-
Yokado, the former has more places for promotion than the later. However, Ito-Yokado is also 
advancing its localization of HRM from this point of view. There is also a difference in the 
proportion of PCNs in each store. There are a number of PCNs in Ito-Yokado; however, in 
Carrefour, although PCNs accounted for a large fraction of board members in every subsidiary 
company, there was a low percentage in the store level. 
Through a comparison of Ito-Yokado and Carrefour, it is clear that the latter is advancing its 
localization of HRM more than the former by transferring personnel authority to the local level, 
and the appointment of more Chinese to store manager positions. The reasons for this could be 
explained from two points of view. One is from the point of view of the Japanese company’s 
culture, custom or behavioral norms; the other is the company itself. Japanese companies 
overseas have been criticized for their practice of HRM compared to Western companies, such as 
low rank of salary, low speed of promotion and not enough local top managers. The situation has 
slightly changed as is proved by Ito-Yokado. However, the Japanese retailer focuses more on 
details than their Western counterparts and requires a high quality of service. In order to achieve 
this, it is not realistic to train and educate employees in a short period. It is necessary to 
“brainwash” them by daily education. Therefore, they tend to take long time to educate 
employees even though they recognize that it might lead to a low rate of promotion and other 
152     International Journal of Business Anthropology vol. 3(1) 2012
 results. The other factor is that Ito-Yokado’s corporate culture does not place an emphasis on 
profit, sales or ranking, but on the trust and the contribution to society, which has a great 




This paper described changes in Chinese retail and retail policy, Carrefour and Ito-Yokado’s 
expansion into China and their management strategies. Chinese retail policy has changed and 
regulation was alleviated to some degree because of the open-door policy, entry into the WTO, 
and the law that was instituted in 2004. Therefore, the competition among foreign retailers has 
become severe and every company goes to great effort to gain a dominant market position. 
Carrefour and Ito-Yokado had different management strategies in China. Carrefour opened many 
stores in China in order to follows the company’s “mission”, which places emphasis on high 
ranking and a dominant position in the market. As a result, the lack of sufficient employees, 
especially qualified executives, became a serious problem. In order to solve this problem, the 
company accelerated the localization of HRM. Carrefour gave authority to local people to recruit 
executive candidates, and trained them by intensive training mostly in local areas, and then 
promoted as many Chinese employees as they could. Ito-Yokado, on the other hand, because of 
their concentration on details and on quality of service, tended to educate employees from the 
very beginning and teach them thoroughly by daily conferences, which employees described a 
process of “brainwash”, and which led to a relatively slow speed of promotion. Although Ito-
Yokado has advanced its localization of HRM in recent years, it does not localize as Carrefour 
does in terms of transferring personnel authority to the local level and promoting Chinese to 
executives. The reason why Ito-Yokado localized less HRM than Carrefour could be explained 
in terms of Japanese company’s behavioral norms and customs, and the company’s corporate 
culture, which spent a long time on on-the-job-trainig. It also forced them to strengthen 
punishment. This is the opposite of Carrefour to some extent, since the company focused more 
on the company visibility and its status in the Chinese market. By investigating Carrefour and 
Ito-Yokado, it is relatively clear that their management principles play a significant role in their 
strategies. It is getting harder for a company which wants to enter into the Chinese market to 
follow the example of Carrefour since the competition is much more intense and the Chinese 
people’s consumer behavior and preferences are changing nowadays. In order to be a winner in 
the Chinese market, it is important to have sufficient financial resources and a clear overseas 
strategy, and to understand what Chinese customers really want nowadays. Although Ito-
Yokado’s strategy is taking some time to see fruits, it actually affects an increase in the total 
sales. 
The paper has several limitations and unresolved issues. It is true that companies change very 
quickly and this paper may not contain up-to-date information. It should be noted that this paper 
is only an initial attempt to explore the localization of retail companies in the Chinese market, 
and additional research on the following areas is needed for a better understanding of the issue. 
First, how do foreign managers actually deal with local employees? What causes problems of 
communication? Each Japanese executive in Ito-Yokado has a translator, which might be the gap 
between Japanese bosses and local subordinates. Second, how far should a company practice 
localization? Almost all employees and store managers in Carrefour are Chinese; however, is this 
really a good thing? After Carrefour entered into the Chinese market, the company has had many 
food safety issues. Many customers wonder why this only happens in China but not in France. 
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 There have been many accidents or fights between employees or security staff and customers. 
Besides these problems, bribery between employees and suppliers is also a serious issue for 
Carrefour. It might be because of their delegation of “sufficient” authority to the local level, 
intensive training and quick speed of promotion. How should the company resolve these 
problems? Finally, should retailers in China shift their strategy from “low price, cheap quality, 
bad service” to “middle price, high quality of products and service”? Along with economic 
growth and increase of people’s level of consumption, Chinese people need products with high 
value and stores whose employees are well trained. Carrefour still does not place much emphasis 
on the quality of products or service but more on the price. It is important to note that not only 
foreign retailers but also local companies probably need to shift their management strategies so 
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